F-35 ZOMBIE SHUFFLE: FLEET SIZE "UNDER REVIEW".

"That's enough?"

It would seem as though the summer is a very unlucky time for the Joint Strike Fighter.

Last summer, the F-35 weathered some stormy PR after spontaneously combusting during take off.  This would have been bad enough by itself, but the incident caused the JSF to be a no-show at its international debut.

This summer, Lockheed Martin and Joint Program Office are mobilizing their PR departments once again after a not-so-complimentary report was leaked detailing the F-35's lack of dogfighting prowess.  Some have dismissed the report as "garbage" (yet still slam the JSF for being a "bloated failure").  Whatever the merit of the report, it is still a harsh blow to a program that once boasted of the JSF's superiority compared to fourth-generation fighters.

This latest bit of PR shenanigans may soon be forgotten if this next shoe drops, however...

In a document addressed to the United States of America's Senate Armed Services Committee, (SASC), Marine General Joseph Dunford addressed questions about the F-35's troubles thusly:

[QUESTION:]  “Do you believe the nation can afford to procure these aircraft at a cost of $12B to $15B per year for nearly the next 20 years for an aircraft design that will be 30 years old at the completion of the program procurement phase?”

[ANSWER:]  “Given the evolving defense strategy and the latest Defense Planning Guidance, we are presently taking the newest strategic foundation and analyzing whether 2,443 aircraft is the correct number."

This could be big.

This could mean that the Pentagon is looking at purchasing more F-35s, but given the context, it seems unlikely.   While the U.S. Military seems to have undying patience for the JSF program, the politicians in charge of the pursestrings do not.

Internationally, the Joint Strike Fighter has not quite met the sales expectations envisioned at the start of the program.  While some orders have trickled in, most partner nations have drastically cut their intended numbers.  Others have decided to "wait and see" while upgrading and extending the life of older fighter inventories.  Some, like Canada and Denmark, have "reset" in order to examine other options.

Bottom line:  The F-35 will not sell as well internationally as originally hoped.  If the USA decides to cut its numbers, there could be trouble for the program.  The JSF depends on economies of scale to help bring down unit price.  As sales decrease, the unit price increases.  As price increases, sales decrease.  (etc, etc...)  This could lead to the infamous "death spiral".

I have stated before that the "death spiral" is an unlikely scenario.  There is too much invested already to deem the aircraft a complete failure and start fresh.  Instead, numbers will be drastically cut and the F-35 will become more of a niche aircraft like the B-1B or F-22 instead of next F-16.

Like a proverbial zombie, the JSF program will continue to shuffle along...  But rotten chunks of it are starting to fall off.

[For those who haven't read it, you can find my original "Zombie Shuffle" post here] Published: By: Unknown - 6:37 AM

F-35 CAN'T DOGFIGHT. SUPRISED?

Were you surprised by the recent hullaballoo regarding the F-35's lack of dogfighting prowess?  If so, you have not been paying much attention.

Several days ago, an article was posted on the "War is Boring" blogsite entitled:  Test Pilot Admits the F-35 Can't Dogfight.  The article described a 5-page report in which a test pilot criticized the JSF's performance during combat testing against a F-16D Fighting Falcon.  Shortly after, War is Boring published the entire report.

Aviation week has hosted the report in PDF form here. Or you can read it below.

F-35 High AoA Maneuvers

The exercise, which occurred in January, pitted an early production F-35A (the standard CTOL model) against a Block 40 F-16D.  The F-35 had no stealth coating, nor did it have weapons mounted internally or externally.  The F-16D carried no weapons, but did mount two 370 gallon wing tanks.

The F-35A seemed to have every advantage.  Its stealth coating would have been on no use in WVR combat, but the absence of it and internal weapons likely saved a few pounds.  Meanwhile, the two-seat F-16D is one of heavier F-16 variants, but its GE-100 engine lacks the thrust of Block 50 models equipped with either the General Electric F110-GE-129 or Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-129 (28,000lbs of thrust vs 29,400lbs).  The F-16D was also carrying two external fuel tanks, limiting maneuvers to 7g until they were empty, as well as adding weight and drag.

To put is simply, the Viper was sandbagging.

Despite this, the F-35 faired poorly.  Its mass, small wing area, lack of thrust, intrusive flight software and cumbersome helmet all conspired against it.

The report is well worth a read, but here are some choice bits:

• Overall, the most noticeable characteristic of the F-35A in a visual engagement was its lack of energy maneuverability. 

• The EM of the F-35A is substantially inferior to the F-15E with PW-229s due to a smaller wing, similar weight, and ~15,000 Ibs less in afterburner thrust. So, in general, the high AoA capabilities of the jet could not be used in an effective way without significantly reducing follow-on maneuvering potential. Even with the limited F-16 target configuration, the F-35A remained at a distinct energy disadvantage for every engagement. 

• Insufficient pitch rate exacerbated the lack of EM. 

• No effective guns defense was found during this test. 

• The helmet was too large for the space inside the canopy to adequately see behind the aircraft. There were multiple occasions when the bandit would've been visible (not blocked by the seat) but the helmet prevented getting in a position to see him.

• Though the aircraft has proven it is capable of high AOA flight, it wasn't effective for killing or surviving attacks primarily due to lack of energy maneuverability. 

The report also goes into detail about the HMD displaying HMD BST FAULT lights as well as intrusive flight software that would fight the pilots commands initially, but then perform the inputed maneuver after-the-fact.

I can't imagine how those "antlers" could be a problem...

Some of these problems, like the intrusive flight software could be fixed with a mere software patch.  Others, like the bulky helmet, might be correctable in the future given a redesign of the cockpit and/or helmet itself.  

Other issues, like the lack of power, high weight, and small wings are a little tougher to fix.  While a more powerful engine is being studied for the JSF, do not expect to see it anytime soon.  Even then, it likely would not be enough.  As the report states, the F-35 weighs nearly as much as an F-15E, yet makes do with about ¾ of the power and wing area.  By comparison, the F-16 weighs in at just over half of the F-15Es weight, and fittingly has 50% of the power, and 50% of the wing area.

In short, you cannot change the laws of physics.  The F-35 simply has less thrust and lift than the F-16 compared to its weight.

So why is everybody surprised by this report?

It probably has not helped that, in its fervor to promote the controversial JSF, Lockheed Martin has made claims that the F-35 has equal or better kinematics than 4th generation fighters.

As luck would have it, the Lockheed Martin test pilot in the video above extols the virtues of both the F-35's dogfighting capability and its helmet...  Two issues specifically noted in the report as being lacking.

Following this latest report, the folks at Lockheed Martin and the Joint Program Office have done some backpedaling, stating that the 5-page report "Doesn't Tell the Entire Story", since the F-35 used  "was not equipped with many of the features that gives it an advantage".

“It [the F-35 in question] is not equipped with the weapons or software that allow the F-35 pilot to turn, aim a weapon with the helmet, and fire at an enemy without having to point the airplane at its target.”

Given that the report mentioned issues with the helmet's mobility this might not have been much of a game changer.  Also, while the AMRAAM is HOBS (high off-boresight) missile, using it thus reduces the missile's energy as it maneuvers and reduces its probability of kill (pK).  There is also no mention that the F-16 (or any other modern fighter) could potentially have the same HOBS capability, as well as a more suitable WVR missile like the AIM-9X or IRIS-T.

Long time JSF defenders, The Lexington Institute, have gone so far as to call the F-35's lack of dogfighting chops to be a feature, not a bug.  Err...  Yeah.

While it is true that BVR combat has been predominant since the Gulf War, that does not mean the days of the dogfight are over.  Air combat throughout the last few decades has been extremely lopsided.  A vastly superior force taking on antiquated fighters that are outnumbered, poorly maintained, flown by less experienced pilots, and lacking modern AWAC support.

The USAF had declared the gun passé prior to the Vietnam War, a deadly mistake for its pilots.  Are they making the same mistake again?  (More on this in a later post...)

Is it just for decoration?

Last summer, during my "Fighter Jet Fight Club" series, I routinely gave the F-35 low marks in the dogfighting category.  While this was mostly educated guessing on my part, I can now back up those low scores even more.  

With more evidence that the F-35 simply is not a good dogfighter, the Joint Program Office seems to be downplaying the need for such.  Instead they continue to play to the JSF's strengths.  They state the F-35 was superior to both the A-10 and F-16 during a close air support (CAS) exercise, without going into detail as to what that exercise entailed.  They also remind us that the F-35 is still meeting "test points" like dropping bombs onto target.

This could be a sticky one, however.  The idea of a fighter jet that cannot "turn and burn" as good as an aircraft designed in the 70s seems like a giant step backward to some.  At the very least, it will make people question if an aircraft that is so expensive, and so late, is even worth it. Published: By: Unknown - 4:06 PM

F-35's engine troubles

It would seem fair to say that the most important component on an airplane is the engine.

UAVs can fly without a cockpit.  Lifting bodies can fly without wings.  Without a method of propulsion, an aircraft is considered a glider.  An underpowered aircraft finds itself few fans.  Unreliable engines end up making the wrong kind of headlines.

So, yeah...  Engines are a big deal.  Especially when it comes to $100 million jet fighters.

When one reads news about the JSF, the fighter that will represent the vast majority of allied airpower for the next 30 to 40 years, headlines describing the F-35 engine as both "unreliable" and "costly" are bound to give one pause.

A recent Pentagon Inspector General report slammed the JSF's Pratt & Whitney F135.  The report accounted of 61 instances where the engine did not meet the Pentagon's regulatory standards during inspection.  These issues were widespread, including project management, software, supply lines, and mechanical issues.

"Based on those nonconformities, we identified systemic findings in the following areas," the Inspector General report notes. "[P]rogram management oversight, critical safety item compliance, continuous improvement, risk management, supplier management, and software quality management."

These engine troubles have severely slowed progress of the F-35 program.  The most glaring example  of which resulted when the entire fleet was grounded following an engine fire last year.  Grounded aircraft cannot make test flights, and those test flights need to be done before the aircraft can be considered operational.

Not only is the P&W F135 unreliable, but it is expensive as well.

The key business case of the JSF was that it would deliver a cutting edge aircraft at an affordable aircraft thanks to economies of scale.  The same economies of scale that have made the F-16 such a success.  In theory, costs would drop sharply as production ramped up.

Both Lockheed Martin and the JSF program office have gone to great pains reassuring the public that costs have begun to drop.  Unfortunately, those cost reductions do not include the F-35's engine.

In 2010, a small batch (16) of F135s were built, each costing $31.8 million.  Two years later that same engine cost $31.3 million, despite production being more than doubled at 37.  Last year, the engine still cost $29.9 million.  For some reason, the cost seems to be stuck at the near-$30 million mark with unit costs rising or falling year-to-year despite higher production.

(I have purposely ignored the outliers:  $21.9M for LRIP 1 and $35.5M for LRIP 3.)

From Defense-Aerospace.com

At roughly $30 million, the F135 would represent over one-third of the F-35's intended cost, $85 million.  Instead, the current cost of an F-35 (with engine) is well over the $200 million (US) mark.  At current prices, it would cost Canada over $13 billion to procure a fleet of 65, well over the $9 billion planned.

Some may blame the F-35's current engine troubles on the cancellation of an alternative engine, the GE F136.  With a monopoly on building JSF engines, Pratt & Whitney have no reason to worry about losing one of the largest (and most profitable) military contracts in modern history.

Oddly enough, the exact same problem arose in the early 80s, when Pratt & Whitney was the sole supplier of the F100 turbofan used in both the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon.  The engine was described as difficult to maintain and subject to turbine and stalling troubles.  When the USAF allowed competition, the resulting "Great Engine War" led to greatly improved engines at a reduced cost.

Perhaps history will repeat itself if the F-35 gets its planned adaptive cycle engine, but one wonders why the same lesson would need to be taught again.


Published: By: Unknown - 7:43 AM

Another damning POGO report for the F-35...

It should not surprise anyone who has been following recent JSF news that the most recent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) report on the F-35 does not exactly paint a rosy picture of the program.

Weapons that do not fit the F-35's engine bay, continued software glitches, an engine fire, and the usual escalation in costs continue to raise questions about the JSF.

Here are some highlights:

• In spite of the focused effort, the program was not able to accomplish its goal of completing Block 2B flight testing by the end of October. 
• As a result of the engine failure that occurred in an F-35A in late June, the program imposed aircraft operating limitations (AOL) on all variants of F-35.
• Due to the AOL, numerous test points needed for the Block 2B fleet release and Marine Corps IOC were blocked and cannot be attempted until the restrictions are lifted. 
• Progress in weapons integration, in particular the completion of planned Block 2B weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) events, has been less in 2014 compared to that planned by the program. 
• Overall suitability continues to be less than desired by the Services, and relies heavily on contractor support and unacceptable workarounds, but has shown some improvement in CY14. 
• Aircraft availability was flat over most of the past year, maintaining an average for the fleet of 37 percent for the 12-month rolling period ending in September – consistent with the availability reported in the FY13 DOT&E report of 37 percent for the 12-month period ending in October 2013. (This managed to break 50% in October, however.)
• Inspections of the engines on all variants led to discoveries on nine production and test aircraft requiring engine replacement. 

Reliability continues to be a problem.  As you can see in the table below, the total fleet average is 39%.  At best, no more than 6 aircraft are available for every 10 in the fleet.  

There has also been a rather controversial practice of fudging some numbers by reclassifying inherent failures (caused by design) as induced failures (caused by mishandling).  I have gone over this before here:  http://bestfighter4canada.blogspot.ca/2015/01/2015-f-35-dot-report-more-of-same-with.html

The Project on Government Oversight, also known as POGO, has released a damning critique of the JSF's latest report.  They state that the F-35 is "Not ready for prime time...".  They also state that it is highly unlikely that the aircraft will meet its IOC target later this year...  Or anytime soon.  

You can find it here:  http://www.pogo.org/our-work/straus-military-reform-project/weapons/2015/not-ready-for-prime-time.html

Wherever you go, there seems to be more critique of the F-35...  And rightly so.  When the costliest weapon system in history lags behind in development while continuing to consume budgets, people soon start shouting for some accountability.  

Published: By: Unknown - 11:02 AM

Facepalm of the Week: Some of the F-35B's SDBs will be MIA.

Raytheon SDB-II

"Measure twice.  Cut once."

Carpenters know the phrase well.  In the literal sense, it means to take extra care in measuring the desired dimensions before cutting.  If the measurement is off, you will need to redo it, with a good chance you just wasted a perfectly good piece of lumber.

In the figurative sense, it simply means to be methodical and careful before putting a plan into action.

One wonders if the folks in the JSF program office measured twice.

In the latest bit of JSF news, it turns out that the F-35B will not be able to fit the required load of Small Diameter Bombs (SDB-II) inside its weapons bays.  Instead of eight, the STOVL version of the JSF will have to make due with four (two per bay).  This would not be such a big deal, except for the fact that the SDB's purpose is to allow fighters to strike more targets.

I have ranted on about the F-35's weapon bays in the past.  While they do improve stealth, they offer less flexibility than external pylons.  Weapon selection is dependent on whether or not it fits inside the box.

How it's supposed to look.

How did this happen?  It turns out that the F-35B's weapons bays are slightly smaller in volume due to the need to accommodate the STOVL lift fan.  This limits it to 1000lbs class JDAMs instead of the 2000lbs JDAMs carried by the F-35A and F-35C.

This has been a known issue since 2007, but a fix likely will not occur until the "Block 4" upgrades slated for 2022.  This is no big deal, since the SDB-II was not scheduled to appear on the JSF until Block 4 anyway.

“I think it's just the B. When we did our fit checks on the JSF, the A and the C basically had the same bay”.

 Let us hope that there are not many more "surprises" involving the already over budget and overdue F-35.

Published: By: Unknown - 3:22 PM

USN cuts its F-35C order by a third!

In news that will surely have repercussions to the JSF program, the United States Navy has chosen to cut back their F-35C orders until 2020 by as much as a third. 

Instead, the USN will pursue more stand-off weapons (ie: ALCMs). 

The news can be seen here:  http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-35cs-cut-back-us-navy-invests-standoff-weapons

"The Navy’s budget priorities reflect the views of Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert. In June 2012, shortly after he was appointed as CNO, Greenert published an article in the Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine that downplayed the importance of advanced platforms, including stealth aircraft, in favor of “payloads” including standoff weapons."

In order for the F-35 to meet its production goals over the next few years, those USN sales will have to be made up some other way. Otherwise, its price will remain high, resulting in the "death spiral" or, at least, a "zombie shuffle". 

Published: By: Unknown - 3:24 PM

2015 F-35 DOT&E report: More of the same... With some fudging.

Mmmm...  Fudge.

The Pentagon's Director Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) report was released this week allowing us to take a peek at how well the JSF's testing has been going over the last year.

This has been an interesting year for the JSF, to say the least.  While it has been the brunt of much criticism (including mine), the program has seen quite a bit of progress over the last year.  The biggest sigh of relief must have been when two F-35Cs successfully completed carrier landing trials, putting that nasty tailhook problem to bed.

Of course, the elephant in the JSF's room for 2014 was the ill-timed engine fire that put a halt to the F-35's international debut at the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) and the Farnborough Air Show after that.  A fix has been devised for engine issue, but flight restrictions were put in place, keeping F-35 test pilots from testing the aircraft's limits.

None of this is any surprise to those who have been following the program.

The real stand out in the 2015 DOT&E report is not so much in what is being reported, but how things are being reported.  It would seem as if some numbers were being fudged to make for a more positive image.  This was done three ways:

1. Reclassifying something as an "induced" failure (i.e. caused by wear-and-tear), rather than an "inherent" failure (i.e. design flaw).
2. Counting flight hours of all 100 aircraft, but only counting failures of the 30 aircraft with the most up-to-date parts.  (Thereby dramatically increasing the failure-free flight hour rate).
3. Fixes that require multiple attempts to find a solution are recorded as a single repair.  (Previously each attempt was recorded).

The report also brings to light an issue with the F-35's stealth coverings.  Repairs currently require a 48 hour "cure" time.  New materials may reduce this to as little as 12 hours, but require refrigeration, something that might be difficult to provide while operating from austere conditions.

Defense-aerospace.com is hosting a PDF of the report here:  http://www.defense-aerospace.com/dae/articles/communiques/DOT-E_2014_Annual_Report_Section_on_F-35.pdf

Here are some highlights:

• In spite of the focused effort, the program was not able to accomplish its goal of completing Block 2B flight testing by the end of October. 
• Based on test point accomplishment rates experienced since October 2013, the program will complete Block 2B development in February 2015. 
• As a result of the engine failure that occurred in an F-35A in late June, the program imposed aircraft operating limitations (AOL) on all variants of F-35 aircraft at the flight test centers and operational/training bases. These AOLs were:

          -  Maximum speed of 1.6 Mach (0.9 Mach for production aircraft at operational/training bases), 

          -  Maximum g-load of 3.2 g for test aircraft and 3.0 for production aircraft, 

          -  Maneuvers limited to half-stick roll rate and 18 degrees angle of attack 

          -  No rudder input, unless required for safe flight (production aircraft restriction only)

• Due to the AOL, numerous test points needed for the Block 2B fleet release and Marine Corps IOC were blocked and cannot be attempted until the restrictions are lifted. 
• Progress in weapons integration, in particular the completion of planned Block 2B weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) events, has been less in 2014 compared to that planned by the program. The program planned to complete all 15 Block 2B WDA events by the end of October, but completed only 7.
• Overall suitability continues to be less than desired by the Services, and relies heavily on contractor support and unacceptable workarounds, but has shown some improvement in CY14. 
• Inspections of the engines on all variants led to discoveries on nine production and test aircraft requiring engine replacement. 
• Restrictions imposed on the fleet from the June engine failure coupled with the focus on Block 2B mission systems testing hampered progress in F-35A flight sciences testing. 
• Progress in weapons integration, in particular the completion of planned weapon delivery accuracy (WDA) events, has been very limited in 2014 compared to that planned by the program. Multiple deficiencies in mission systems, aircraft grounding, and subsequent flight restrictions caused by the June engine failure all contributed to the limited progress.
• Overall suitability continues to be less than desired by the Services, and relies heavily on contractor support and unacceptable workarounds, but has shown some improvement in CY14.

-  Aircraft availability was flat over most of the past year, maintaining an average for the fleet of 37 percent for the 12-month rolling period ending in September – consistent with the availability reported in the FY13 DOT&Ereport of 37 percent for the 12-month period ending in October 2013. However, the program reported an improved availability in October 2014, reaching an average rate of 51 percent for the fleet of 90 aircraft and breaking 50 percent for the first time, but still short of the program objective of 60 percent set for the end of CY14. The
bump in availability in October brought the bump in availability in October brought the fleet 12-month average to 39 percent.-  Measures of reliability and maintainability that have ORD requirements have improved since last year, but all nine reliability measures (three for each variant) are still below program target values for the current stage of development. The reliability metric that has seen the most improvement since May 2013 is not an ORD requirement, but a contract specification metric, mean flight hour between failure scored as “design controllable” (which are equipment failures due to design flaws). For this metric, the F-35B and F-35C are currently above program target values,and F-35A is slightly below the target value, but has been above the target value for several months over the last year. 

•  Low availability rates, in part due to poor reliability, are preventing the fleet of fielded operational F-35 aircraft (all variants) from achieving planned, Service-funded flying hour goals. Original Service bed-down plans were based on F-35 squadrons ramping up to a steady state, fixed number of flight hours per tail per month, allowing for the projection of total fleet flight hours. 
• The most recent 90-day rolling averages for MFHBF_DC show more growth in this metric than for any other reliability metric for the period from May 2013 through August 2014. The following contributed to the reported growth in MFHBF_DC.

0. • -  In June 2013, the program re-categorized nut plate failures, one of the most common failures in the aircraft, as induced failures rather than inherent failures, removing them from the calculation of MFHBF_DC. Nut plates are bonded
     to an aircraft structure and receive bolt-type fasteners to hold removable surface panels in place. One way nut plates can fail, for example, is when torquing a bolt down while replacing a removed panel, the nut plate dis-bonds from the aircraft structure, preventing securing the surface panel.
     
   • -  Distinguishing between inherent design failures and induced failures can be subjective in certain cases. For example, if a maintainer working on the aircraft bumps a good component with a tool and breaks it while working on a different part nearby, it is a judgment call whether that is an inherent design failure because the component could not withstand “normal” wear and tear in operational service, or if it’s an induced failure because the maintainer was “too rough.”

• For example, as of September 2014, an improved horizontal tail actuator component had been introduced and installed on roughly 30 aircraft out of a fleet of nearly 100. Failures of the older component were not being counted in the metrics at all anymore, but flight hours from all 100 aircraft were counted. This calculation could result in the reported reliability of that component being increased by up to a factor of three compared to reliability if all of the horizontal tail actuator failures were counted. There are hundreds of components on the aircraft, so a single component’s increased estimate of reliability may have little influence on overall observed aircraft reliability. However, since multiple components are being upgraded simultaneously due to the unprecedented and highly concurrent nature of the F-35 program, the cumulative effect on the overall observed aircraft reliability of the increased estimate of reliability from all of these components may be significant. 

Maintenance as a whole remains to be a challenge for the F-35, with the report stating that "The amount of time spent on maintenance for all variants exceeds that required for mature aircraft".  Much of this time seems to be spent dealing with the finicky Automated Logistic Information System (ALIS). 

 "The program develops and fields ALIS in increments similar to the mission systems capability in the air vehicle. Overall, ALIS is behind schedule, has several capabilities delayed or deferred to later builds, and has been fielded with deficiencies. The program does not have a dedicated end-to-end developmental testing venue for ALIS and has relied on feedback from the field locations for identifying deficiencies. Though some of the early deficiencies have been addressed, ALIS continues to be cumbersome to use and inefficient, and requires the use of workarounds for deficiencies awaiting correction"

Despite all this, the USMC is still insisting that the F-35B will meet its initial operating capability (IOC) by July of this year.  This has skewed testing towards the STOVL version of the JSF while testing on the other two versions has lagged behind.

It should be noted here the "initial operating capability" is not the same as "full operating capability". All that is required for IOC is a handful of aircraft with a limited weapon capability.  It will not be ready to "go to war".  At best, it will be useful for training purposes and further testing.

Since the F-35B is capable of supersonic flight and BVR combat, it can be seen as a serious upgrade from the USMC's soon-to-be-retired fleet of AV-8B Harriers.  With its limited Block 2B software, the JSF does not yet meet the capability of the USMC's fleet of F/A-18C/D Hornets (not-Super).  That is probably why the USMC will keep its legacy Hornets until 2029.

While Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon often brag about the F-35's progress, one thing is very much certain:  The Joint Strike Fighter still has a way to go.

Published: By: Unknown - 12:42 PM

More F-35 news... None of it good.

Oooh...  Fancy.

I always get suspicious when the the JSF program releases a fancy new picture and a bit of positive news.  While the photograph is always well done, the "good news" is usually rather anti-climatic.  Often, it merely boasts of meeting defined test points, stuff that should be deemed merely acceptable, not brag-worthy.  What would be news is if the JSF did not meet these test points.

This is exactly the case this past weekend, when the program office released the picture you see above, along with the press statement that the "F-35 CONTINUES ON PATH TOWARD FULL WEAPONS CERTIFICATION"

Good to know that the F-35 might actually have weapons when the USMC declares initial operating capability (IOC) in six months.

As impressive as that photo above looks, there are a few caveats:

First of all, ignore those 25mm cannon rounds in the foreground.  The gun that shoots them will not be ready until 2019.

Second, you will notice most of the weapons displayed are variations of ether the JDAM or the Paveway guided bombs.  Nothing to sneeze at, sure...  But nothing that is not already in use by most modern western fighters.  The only true air-to-ground missile on display is the AGM-88 HARM (the ones on the extreme left and right).  NOPE!  Sorry.  Those are AMRAAMs.

Third, look at what is NOT pictured.

• No MBDA Meteor
• No AGM-65 Maverick
• No ASRAAM (although they are supposed to be working on it)
• No external fuel tanks
• No Brimstone missiles
• No rocket pods
• No ALCM "stand off" missiles (like the AGM-84 SLAAM-ER)
• No anti-radiation missiles like the AGM-88 HARM
• No air-to-ground missiles of any kind, actually...  Just freefall bombs.

Obviously, F-35 weapon testing still has quite a way to go to approach the capability level of other modern fighters, or even the legacy fighters it is intended to replace.  It will likely get there someday, but it will have to wait until the Block 3, possibly even Block 4 software update somewhere down the line.

For comparison...

So why this sudden announcement that the F-35 will be able to carry a handful of weapons?

Magicians often use a form of distraction, or misdirection, to distract the audience's attention away from what is really happening, helping create an elaborate illusion.  The reality is often far less spell binding.

So what is really happening?

Britain's first F-35's will cost almost $¼ billion each.

The UK will spend almost £2.1 billion for its first JSF squadron.  With 14 fighters, plus support equipment and spares, that comes out to £154.5 million per aircraft.  In today's currency market, that converts to $235 million US or (gulp) $280 million each in Canadian loonies.

Keep in mind that this cost is for the more costly F-35B STOVL variant, and that the UK are purchasing early production models.  Costs will undoubtedly be lower for the peak-production F-35A models that the RCAF has on its wish list.  In order to fit in Canada's intended $9 billion acquisition budget, that cost would have to come down to a mere $138 million each (including support equipment and spares).

[NOTE:  For the sake of simplicity, this site will ignore nebulous "unit costs" and "flyaway cost" numbers and concentrate strictly on what it costs to set up a desired number of aircraft.  More on this in a future post]

"Uh-oh."

Chinese hacking was worse than we thought.

German news outlet Der Spiegel has made public some of the classified documents infamous hacktivist Edward Snowden released unto the world.  Not only do these document show the extent of how extensive (and unprofessional) cyber-surveillance has come, but it also shows just how much of the JSF program's secrets have fallen into Chinese government hands.

The fact that China had access to classified F-35 data has been known for years.  What has not been known is the extent of that information.  

Some reports are coming in that the Chinese had access to 50 terabytes of data, including "detailed engine schematics and radar design."  If that was not enough, they also came buy 220 megabytes worth of F-22 information and 65 gigabytes on the C-17 cargo aircraft.  

For those of you who are less-than-computer savvy, please allow me to put those numbers into context:

• 220 megabytes is roughly equivalent to 4 encyclopedia books.  
• 65 gigabytes is more than an entire library floor.  (Mid range smartphones and tablets often have 64 gigs).
• 50 terabytes is 5 times that of the printed information in the U.S. Library of Congress.  (Many high-end desktop computers come with one, maybe two terabyte-sized hard drives.)

That is a LOT of data.

They might want to change their password.

Published: By: Unknown - 8:05 AM

The F-35's gun doesn't really matter.

"Meh...  We'll come back to that later."

For those of you keeping up with current events, you may have noticed the fury and uproar regarding the latest bit of JSF news.  Specifically, the fact that the F-35 will not have the capability to fire its cannon until at least 2019.

How could a $400 billion (possibly $1.5 trillion) fighter program leave out something as simple and basic as a gun?  What good is a fighter without a cannon?  Why will it take another four years just to get one to work?

I am here to tell you it does not really matter, anyway.

Even if Canada did decide to order the F-35 today, it likely would not receive its first airframes until 2017-2019 at the earliest.  Even then, a CF-35 would not enter service until for a few years after that.  Full operational tempo would not occur until the early 2020s.  In the meantime, the RCAF will still have its life-extended CF-18s armed with the tried-and-true M61 Vulcan 20mm cannon.

So why is everyone kicking up a fuss?

F-4 with belly-mounted gunpod

The F-35's gun problem seems similar to that shared with the 60s era multi-service F-4 Phantom II.  During the F-4's design phase, it was believed that guided missile technology had progressed enough to make cannons obsolete.  The era of the dogfight was over.  Fighter pilots would simply be eliminate their opponents from beyond visual range, thanks to superior American radar and missile technology.

The kill ratio of the AIM-7 Sparrow was an abysmal 9.2%.Out of 612 AIM-7s fired only 97 hit their target, resulting in 56 kills.  Only two of these could be considered BVR (beyond visual range).

The heat-seaking AIM-9 Sidewinder of the time fared slightly better, with a pK (probability of kill) ratio of 18%.

The Vietnamese did not get the memo about how the cannon was obsolete, and focused on close-range combat against larger and clumsier American fighters.  Vietnamese aces quickly outnumbered American aces, despite using "inferior" MiG-17s and MiG-21s.  It did not take long before F-4 crews demanded their aircraft be fitted with cannons.

A stop-gap measure was put in place, mounting gunpods to the aircraft.  Unfortunately, these added unwelcome drag to the F-4, and were not particularly accurate.  Phantom crews would have to wait until the F-4E to get a proper nose-mounted cannon.

F-35B with belly-mounted gunpod.

It would seem as if history is repeating itself.

Of the three JSF variants, only the CTOL F-35A comes with an internal cannon.  Both the STOL F-35B and the carrier-launched F-35C will have to make do with an external "multi-mission pod" that contains the same 25mm cannon.

This seems like a rather odd design choice.

Part of the reasoning behind the JSF was to develop a common platform for all air services.  As such, commonality between variants needs to emphasized as much as possible.  So why differentiate the three models on something as basic as a gun?

Presumably, omitting the cannon on the B and C models would save weight.  The F-35B weighs in a full 3,000lbs more than the F-35A.  The difference between the F-35A and the F-35B is a staggering 5,500lbs.

Yet the F-35A's cannon only accounts for 416 pounds, not including ammo.  It is tucked away above the port-side intake, with a neat little door that opens prior to firing.  This keeps the F-35A stealthy.

By contrast, when the F-35B or F-35C mount the cannon, it needs to mount a rather unstealthy 735 pound (not including ammo) pod under the fuselage.  Needless to say, this will compromise performance somewhat.

This performance hit will likely exclude the F-35's mission pod from high-risk missions.  The exact same missions that a cannon may need to be brought to bear as a last resort.  Remember, the JSF only carries a maximum of 4 AMRAAMs internally, AMRAAM's that are capable of hitting a non-maneuvering target 59% of the time.  That kill ratio drops significantly with countermeasures and/or evasive maneuvers.

Then again, it is not the hardware where the F-35's gun is having issues, but the software.  "Full operational capability" has to wait until the Block 3F software.  Software that is already 14 months behind schedule, and has proved to one of the JSF's trickiest issues to deal with.

Firing the F-35's cannon requires more than a simple trigger squeeze.  Aiming needs to be done through the helmet-mounted display, as the F-35 lacks a traditional HUD.  Anything done through the JSF's HMD needs to march lock-step through eight million lines of computer code in order to work.  Programming must be written, tested, and debugged

F-35 weapon testing began in earnest in 2013, but it appears that the JSF's cannon has yet to be fired from a flying aircraft.  A gunpod was mounted on a test flight year ago, but Lockheed Martin's test update webpage makes no mention of cannon testing.

So why the delay?

It could have something to do with the dichotomy of the JSF's cannon.  Internal or external?  One is fixed in place, while the other is temporarily mounted in a completely different position.  The difference may seem minor, but it is there.

Perhaps the cannon is simply a low priority given the other, more serious problems.  Perhaps the F-35 will let other, more traditional aircraft do the brunt of work until the mid-2020s.  Perhaps they just forgot?

In the end, it does not really matter.

If the F-35 is at a point in a mission where something as short-ranged as a 25mm cannon is usable, than something has gone horribly, horribly wrong.

The rationale behind the JSF's design, and the majority of Lockheed Martin PR material promise an undetectable fighter with unparalleled sensor capability.  Its proposed dominance is based simply on the principle of seeing while not being seen itself.  That means staying out of the visual range needed for a cannon.

If a F-35 pilot finds themselves in a dogfight that has closed in to cannon range, that means that their two-to-four AMRAAMs were unable to do the job.  It means that WVR AIM-9 Sidewinders are ineffective, or not carried at all.  It means that their stealth was ineffective against enemy detection.  In that case, the sluggish JSF would be hard-pressed to outmaneuver faster, more agile aircraft like the Su-35.

Even against soft ground targets, the F-35's cannon is likely to be of little use.  Getting close to the ground brings the aircraft within range of heat-seaking MANPADS, and the JSF simply cannot afford to take a hit like the A-10 can.

Some have mentioned that the F-35 would not be able to fire its cannon for very long anyway.  180 rounds disappear pretty fast when fired at 3,000 rounds a minute (50/second).  That is still enough for a few one-second trigger pulls.  For comparison. the Eurofighter Typhoon carries 150 rounds for its 27mm cannon, which fires at a more leisurely 1,000 to 1,700 rounds per minute.

Oddly enough, the Eurofighter Typhoon had its own cannon controversy.  In order to cut costs, RAF pilots were forbidden to fire the aircraft's gun.  Plans to remove the cannon completely were shelved when it was found that replacing it with ballast would cost more than the guns themselves.  Experience in Afghanistan led to a reversal of this decision, thankfully.

In the end, the F-35's current lack of a gun makes little difference.  Even if it did work, it would be of little use for anything except a last-ditch resort.  The aircraft is not cut out to be a dogfighter, nor is it ground pounder akin to the A-10 Warthog.  Like the F-4 Phantom II, its gun seems to be little more than an afterthought.

[EDIT:  I originally posted that the gun was intended for the Block 2B/3I software.  This is not the case.]

Published: By: Unknown - 6:18 AM

The JSF's EOTS will be obsolete at IOC.

The EOTS is already out-of-date.

One of the F-35's "killer apps" is its Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS).  It is a great idea in theory:  Instead of hanging a bulky targeting pod off of the aircraft, the JSF basically has one built in to the airframe.  This way, the F-35 keeps its stealthy profile and frees up weapon stations.

It really would be a rather elegant piece of engineering...  If targeting pods never evolved.

The JSF's EOTS is based on Lockheed Martin's own Sniper Advanced Targeting pod.  It is a great piece of kit and it is currently in use on Canada's own CF-18s in the form of the Sniper XR.  This is the very same version from which the EOTS is based on.

Sniper XR mounted on a CF-18

There is just one small problem.  The Sniper XR first entered service in 2006 and has already been outclassed.

Earlier this year, Lockheed Martin's own Sniper ATP-SE entered service with the USAF.  This newer version not only has better sensor capabilities, but much improved data-link capability.

Targeting pods are a fairly new addition to fighters, but they have proven to be an invaluable asset in modern-day warfare.  These pods allow for more accurate precision strikes with reduced collateral damage.  They will likely continue to improve over the next few years, as well, thanks to healthy competition between Lockheed Martin Sniper and Northrop Grumman's LITENING (not to mention the Thales DAMOCLES).

When the F-35 finally enters widespread service in the 2020s, there is a good chance its EOTS will be several generations old compared to the newest targeting pods.  Unfortunately, its built-in design makes it a bit harder (and expensive) to upgrade.  Not exactly an attractive option for something that is already years late and billions over budget.

More on this story can be found here.






Published: By: Unknown - 9:50 AM

Catching up with JSF news.

Once again I have to apologize for my lack of posting lately.  The holiday season is always a busy time of year for me, and this year the chaos has been upped to the nth degree.  There is light at the end of the tunnel, however.  Hopefully, the new year result in things going back (relative) normal.

In the meantime, I want to thank everyone for participating in the "What if" series of questions.

There has been a lot going on with the JSF in relation to Canada, however, and I would not feel right if the latest developments went unnoticed.

So lets get to it, shall we?

The F-35 needs cool fuel.

F-35 fuel truck, painted white.

It all started when the USAF released photos of F-35 refueling trucks.  Instead of the usual olive drab, the tanks were painted shiny white.  Why?  Because the JSF uses its onboard fuel as a method to cool its various systems.  Imagine if the radiator in your car held fuel instead of coolant.  Instead of cooling just the engine, this fuel also cools all the various electronic systems throughout the aircraft as well.

As you can imagine, fuel that has been sitting in the sun on a hot tarmac for hours tends to gain a little heat.  Using warm fuel as a coolant is counter-productive, so the USAF has decided to repaint its fuel trucks that shiny white in order to mitigate things.  The cost?  $4,000 per truck.

Given Canada's climate, we should not worry too much...  As long as we don't send fighters anywhere warm.

Dutch F-35s will cost about $50,000 per flight hour.

That's US dollars.

The Netherlands has already been forced to cut its F-35 order down to 37 (from 85) in order to fit within its $6 billion acquisition budget.  Now it turns out a small fleet will result in higher than expected operating costs.

Based on an operating tempo of 200 hours per year, Dutch F-35s are estimated to cost $46,200 to $57,600(US) per FLIGHT HOUR.

Whoa.

It really doesn't matter what we pick.

According the the recently released "Evaluation of Options for the Replacement of the CF-18 Fighter Fleet, any of the four fighters studied (Super Hornet, Rafale, Typhoon, and JSF) would do just fine protecting Canada's airspace.

A sizable 90% of Canada's fighter missions occur over North American airspace.  Breaking it down even further, 80% of CF-18 flight hours involve protecting sovereign Canadian airspace.  For the mission of "Defence of Canada" all fighters were deemed "Low to Medium risk" well into the "Beyond 2030" timeframe.

In fact, all of the fighters scored pretty much the same for the majority of missions.  The only stand-out was in the "State-on-State War Fighting" a category that Canada is unlikely to be facing by itself.

The report does not go into detail about which fighter scored better than others.  Oddly enough, all but the F-35 may be out of production by the time Canada finally gets around to replacing its geriatric Hornets.  But the Gripen will.

The report is fairly lengthy, yet does not go into specifics about capabilities or costs.  I will be covering it in depth in the weeks coming up.

Lockheed Martin ripped off its own employee's pension funds.

Lockheed Martin has settled a $1.3 billion dollar lawsuit that claimed it shortchanged its workers' pension plans.  It turns out that excessive fees made for a lower return on investment than if the workers had invested privately.

The whole point of pension plans is that they typically offer less risk and higher returns than private investing.  Otherwise, what's the point?

The Liberal Party of Canada is looking very anti-JSF.

Formerly a Conservative CF-18 pilot, now a Liberal F-35 critic.

If you have any doubts where the Liberal Party of Canada stands on the F-35, look no further.  Former CF-18 pilot Stephen Fuhr has announced that he is running as the Liberal candidate for Kelowna-Lake Country.  Not only that, but Fuhr will also join Justin Trudeau's foreign policy team.

Fuhr has been an outspoken critic of the F-35 for Canada.  Astute readers will recognize his name from the video I posted last month.  

Fellow Liberal (and astronaut) Marc Garneau has also spoken out against the F-35 acquisition.  Other prominent Liberals seem to be well on their way to making the JSF an election issue next year.  

The New Democrat Party seem to be quite anti-JSF as well, calling for an "open and transparent tender process".

It looks like the F-35's fate in Canada could be decided during the next federal election.

[NOTE:  I do not like going political, but there is simply no ignoring what is going on.  The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) are clearly trying to avoid F-35 controversy while covertly going along with troubled program.  It is hard to fly a $46 billion dollar defense acquisition under the radar, however.  This WILL be an election issue.]

Published: By: Unknown - 8:45 AM